Photo of Steve McBradyPhoto of J. Chris HailePhoto of Nicole Owren-WiestPhoto of Skye MathiesonPhoto of Michelle ColemanPhoto of John Nakoneczy

In Tolliver Group, Inc v. U.S. (Jan. 22, 2020), the Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of a contractor who sought reimbursement of legal fees incurred in successfully defending against a False Claims Act (FCA) suit filed by a relator. The qui tam action arose from a defect in the original contract—the

Photo of Peter J. Eyre

Announcing a new podcast feature – Ask Us Anything! Have questions you’d like answered anonymously? Want our thoughts in general on a particular topic? Send in questions and we’ll do our best to feature them in a future podcast. Email your questions to David at drobbins@crowell.com. Disclaimer: we cannot give legal advice unless

The government has reiterated in no uncertain terms its proposed standard for particularity under the FCA: “a qui tam complaint satisfie[s] Rule 9(b) if it contains detailed allegations supporting a plausible inference that false claims were submitted to the government, even if the complaint does not identify specific requests for payment.”  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals, Petition for Certiorari No. 12-1349 (U.S. 2013).  While opining at some length about the state of case law in the lower courts, the Solicitor General ultimately asked the Supreme Court not to hear the case.

Many of us thought that Nathan was a good opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve an apparent split among the circuits (an issue we discussed in posts from February and March of last year).  The point of contention is the particularity required in an FCA complaint under Rule 9(b): is it enough to allege a fraudulent scheme, or must a plaintiff also furnish details about the claims themselves?  The government finds concerns about this circuit split to be somewhat overstated.  See Br. at 10 (“[T]hose circuits that initially endorsed the per se rule [requiring identification of specific claims] have issued subsequent decisions that appear to adopt a more nuanced approach.”).  The government thus finds the extent of inter-circuit disagreement to be “uncertain,” suggesting that it “may be capable of resolution without the Court’s intervention.”  Id. at 10, 14.
Continue Reading Solicitor General Addresses Standard for Rule 9(b) in FCA Cases, Asks Supreme Court Not to

Just last week, the Department of Justice announced another large False Claims Act settlement with a GSA Schedule contractor – for $60.9 million. A review of the underlying qui tam complaint, filed by a former vice president of the contractor, reveals multiple alleged failures by Tremco Inc. and RPM International to comply with the basic – yet often very challenging – requirements of the contract: disclosure of commercial pricing and compliance with the Price Reduction Clause. Among a number of allegations, the complaint alleges that the roofing supplies and services contractor failed to disclose to GSA that it offered better pricing to its commercial customers than identified on its published price list. As a result, the complaint states that the government was disadvantaged by negotiating higher pricing than it would have, had it known about the contractor’s actual commercial pricing practices. The complaint also alleges that, during the course of performing the GSA Schedule contract, the contractor failed to provide price reductions to government customers when it provided discounted pricing to its commercial customers.
Continue Reading GSA Schedule Contracting: Does Your Company Have Sufficient Internal Controls to Minimize Noncompliance Risks?

In March, we published an article entitled “New Questions Regarding The Jurisdictionality Of The FCA’s Public Disclosure Bar: Potential Hurdles And Increased Costs In Defending Against Parasitic Qui Tam Actions,” The Government Contractor, Vol. 55, No. 12 (Mar. 27, 2013). We explored whether, given the 2010 amendments to the civil False Claims Act (FCA) under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), the public disclosure bar1 still implicated a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See P.L. 111-148, title X, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010); 31 USCA § 3729 et seq. (2012). Surveying the few cases to have addressed the issue, we concluded that it was largely an open question. The only opinion to have substantially analyzed the question at that time had concluded that the bar was still jurisdictional. See United States ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi Training Ctr., No. 1:11-cv-371, 2013 WL 1189707, at *9 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2013).2

Since then, several courts have reached the opposite conclusion. Two have made passing reference to the point in footnotes. See United States v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., No. 1:10-cv-322, 2013 WL 3912571, at *7 n.6 (E.D. Tenn. July 29, 2013); United States ex rel. Fox Rx, Inc. v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-962, 2013 WL 2303768, at *8 n.15 (N.D. Ga. May 17, 2013). Another has been more direct, comparing the two versions of the public disclosure bar and concluding that “[a]fter the 2010 amendment, the bar does is [sic] not described as jurisdictional in nature; instead, the statute simply directs that the action or claim be dismissed . . . .” United States ex rel. Paulos v. Stryker Corp., No. 11-0041-cv, 2013 WL 2666346, at *3 (W.D. Mo. June 12, 2013).
Continue Reading The Growing Split Over Whether the FCA’s Public Disclosure Bar is Still a Jurisdictional Limitation

Crowell & Moring recently achieved two substantial victories for its client, Academi Training Center LLC (“ACADEMI”) in a qui tam False Claims Act case in the Eastern District of Virginia . The qui tam relators accused ACADEMI of billing for personnel who did not serve in the labor categories in which they were billed and for personnel who had not been qualified on belt-fed weapons as required under its contract. They also alleged that ACADEMI retaliated against them in violation of the FCA’s whistleblower protections, and sought to advance their claim in federal court instead of in arbitration. The court dismissed the false claim counts and referred the retaliation claims to arbitration.

The court dismissed the false labor billing allegations on two alternative grounds. First, the court held that the FCA’s first-to-file provision barred these allegations. That provision generally precludes a qui tam relator from bringing an action based on the facts underlying a pending case. Because the labor billing allegations had already been made in United States ex rel. Davis v. U.S. Training Ctr., No. 11-2180, 2012 WL 6052051 (4th Cir. Dec. 6, 2012), the court held that the first to file bar applied. Crowell & Moring won a jury verdict in the Davis case in 2011 and that outcome was recently affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. Second, the court also held that the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded these claims. The court held that the public disclosure bar remained a jurisdictional one and found that the Davis complaint qualified as a public disclosure under the FCA, as did a witness declaration filed in that case. The court ruled that the relators’ knowledge did not materially add to the already disclosed allegations and that therefore they did not qualify under the “original source” exception to the public disclosure bar. The court dismissed the labor billing claims under both the first to file and public disclosure bars.


Continue Reading Crowell & Moring Secures Two-Part Victory in Major False Claims Act Case

Photo of Mana Elihu Lombardo

On May 15-16, 2013, Crowell & Moring is hosting its annual Ounce of Prevention Seminar (OOPS). This year’s program, entitled Weathering the Rough Seas of Regulation, will once again provide the government contract community with a comprehensive review of the latest developments in federal contracting.

In the morning session on May 16, attorneys Andy Liu