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On March 21, 2019, the Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Innovation Board (“DIB”) released a report, Software is Never Done: Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage (“the Report”), summarizing DIB’s Software Acquisition and Practices (SWAP) study, which was mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year (FY) 2018. The two-year study involved

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Much that has been written about the bid protest reforms in the Section 809 Panel’s final report has focused on Recommendations 66-69, which expressly address (and propose changes to) the protest process at the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and the Court of Federal Claims (“COFC”). But the 809 Panel’s most impactful recommended changes to

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Adding to the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) new cybersecurity responsibilities, the Department of Defense (DoD) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USDAS) recently issued a memorandum titled Strategically Implementing Cybersecurity Contract Clauses that increases DCMA’s role.  The memorandum tasks DCMA with implementing a process to perform company-wide assessments of contractors’ compliance

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The Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General (IG) recently released a July 6, 2015 Memorandum announcing that it will “immediately” begin the field work for its assessment of DoD compliance with Section 847 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), “Requirements for Senior Defense Officials Seeking Employment with Defense Contractors.” Section 847

On December 3, 2013, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) published the second part of a trio of promised regulations regarding efforts contractors must take to prevent the entry of counterfeit electronics into the DoD supply chain.  We previously discussed the first proposed rule here, published on May 16, 2013, which was supposed to provide the foundation for detection and avoidance of counterfeit parts.  The third proposed rule has still not been released, but will address reporting requirements for identified counterfeit parts.

The second proposed rule, by its own admission, “does not directly implement any specific aspect of section 818,” the statute requiring DoD to assess its policies and systems for the detection of counterfeit electronic parts (see our previous blog post here for more details).  Instead, it continues DoD’s focus on contractor’s purchasing systems to stem the impact of counterfeit parts by amending the regulations concerning the use of higher-level quality systems (such as ISO, ASQ, and SAE standards).  According to the proposed rule, its purpose is “to ensure that agencies assess the risk of nonconforming items when determining whether higher-level quality standards should be used by the Government and relied on by contractors.” 
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On April 26, 2013, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued Department of Defense (“DoD”) Instruction No. 4140.67 to further establish policy to prevent counterfeit materiel at any level of the DoD supply chain. As we have previously blogged about, Section 818 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 required DoD to assess its internal policies for detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts by June 28, 2012 and revise the DoD acquisition regulations to address the detection and avoidance of counterfeit parts by September 26, 2012. However, despite the statutory mandate, DoD has not revised its acquisition regulations and this Instruction appears to be another interim measure.

The instruction serves two main purposes – (1) to establish DoD’s policies regarding counterfeit prevention and (2) assign responsibilities for the prevention, detection, and remediation of counterfeit material. Pursuant to the Instruction, it is DoD’s policy not to procure counterfeit material and DoD will employ a risk-based approach to reduce the frequency and impact of such material by applying prevention and early detection procedures within the supply chain and strengthening the oversight and surveillance procedures for critical material. DoD’s policy under the Instruction is to investigate all cases of suspected counterfeit material and document all occurrences of suspected and confirmed counterfeit material. DoD will make information about counterfeiting available at all levels of the supply chain, seek restitution when cases of counterfeiting are confirmed, and notify at the earliest opportunity criminal investigative organizations or intelligence authorities and those who use such materials.
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The Department of Defense (“DoD”) continues to contract out work that should be handled by federal employees, according to a new Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) study, which finds shortcomings in DoD’s tracking and management of such “inherently governmental” tasks.

The study urges DoD to better police its inventory of contracts—and bring in-house those functions too