The government has reiterated in no uncertain terms its proposed standard for particularity under the FCA: “a qui tam complaint satisfie[s] Rule 9(b) if it contains detailed allegations supporting a plausible inference that false claims were submitted to the government, even if the complaint does not identify specific requests for payment.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals, Petition for Certiorari No. 12-1349 (U.S. 2013). While opining at some length about the state of case law in the lower courts, the Solicitor General ultimately asked the Supreme Court not to hear the case.
Many of us thought that Nathan was a good opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve an apparent split among the circuits (an issue we discussed in posts from February and March of last year). The point of contention is the particularity required in an FCA complaint under Rule 9(b): is it enough to allege a fraudulent scheme, or must a plaintiff also furnish details about the claims themselves? The government finds concerns about this circuit split to be somewhat overstated. See Br. at 10 (“[T]hose circuits that initially endorsed the per se rule [requiring identification of specific claims] have issued subsequent decisions that appear to adopt a more nuanced approach.”). The government thus finds the extent of inter-circuit disagreement to be “uncertain,” suggesting that it “may be capable of resolution without the Court’s intervention.” Id. at 10, 14.
Continue Reading Solicitor General Addresses Standard for Rule 9(b) in FCA Cases, Asks Supreme Court Not to