DOJ Fraud and False Claims Recoveries at Record Levels in FY2011

Raja Mishra

The U.S. Department of Justice reported this week that it recovered $5.6 billion in criminal and civil fraud payments in fiscal year 2011, including more than $3 billion under the civil False Claims Act.  The fraud recoveries set a one-year record for DOJ; the FCA recoveries capped a record-setting three-year period during which DOJ recovered $8.7 billion. The figures underscore the Obama administration’s aggressive pursuit of fraud and false claims.

DOJ said its fraud recoveries were primarily driven by investigations into Medicare, mortgage, grant and contracting frauds. Officials said the recoveries were much-needed revenue generators for the federal government in a time of record debt and deficits.

“These recoveries far exceed the cost of the agents and prosecutors who secured them,” said Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole at a press conference alongside Vice President Joe Biden. “For every dollar Congress has provided for health care enforcement over the past there years, we have recovered nearly seven.”

Health care fraud –including Medicare, Medicaid, and Tricare—accounted for $2.4 billion of the FCA recoveries in fiscal year 2011. Procurement fraud cases accounted for $422 million in fiscal year 2011. 

Qui tam relators filed 638 suits FCA suits in 2011, far exceeding the average annual rate for the past decade. For contractors, these statistics make clear that—now more than ever—timely government contracts counseling is necessary to ensure compliance and avoid becoming a casualty in the government’s escalating war on fraud and false claims.

$199.5 Million Settlement for GSA in FCA Action Against Schedule Holder

J. Catherine Kunz

GSA has now topped the $128 million settlement it reached in 2009 with NetApp – then the largest settlement reached in an FCA action against a GSA Schedule contractor – by settling with Oracle Corporation and Oracle America Inc. this past week in the amount of $199.5 million plus interest. The settlement resolves an FCA action brought by former Oracle employee, Paul Frascella, under the qui tam provisions of the statute, in which the Department of Justice intervened.

The Government’s and relator’s complaints had alleged that Oracle provided false, incomplete, and inaccurate information to the government during its negotiation of the Schedule contract; failed to disclose deep discounts given to the most favored commercial customers; and submitted false certifications. The Government’s complaint also alleged that Oracle actively took steps to ensure that its commercial sales to its basis of award customers did not trigger the Price Reduction Clause by means such as increasing the order size to exceed the contract’s maximum order threshold, arranging for the sale through a reseller rather than directly from Oracle, or changing the terms of the software license sold to the commercial customer so that it differed from the terms of the licenses on the GSA Schedule contract. 

While it would have been interesting to watch the outcome of the case had it been litigated, given the unusual allegations of fraudulent schemes to circumvent the Price Reduction Clause, the settlement amount indicates there were sufficient facts supporting at least some of the allegations, such that the company chose to settle rather than fight the case.

How to avoid being GSA’s (or a whistleblower’s) next target for a fraud action:

  • Ensure your commercial pricing disclosures are current, accurate, and complete
  • Negotiate a Basis of Award customer that your company can competently and consistently monitor with respect to discounts and changes in commercial pricing
  • Implement a rigorous tracking system to ensure that price reductions given to the Basis of Award customer(s) are also given to Government customers
  • Ensure that any certifications signed and submitted to the Government are 100% accurate
  • Implement internal controls and policies that require company personnel – from the sales force to the managers of the Schedule contract – to comply with the contractual requirements
  • Require mandatory training of company personnel to educate individuals on the contractual requirements and the importance of compliance
  • Implement a reporting system that allows employees to report concerns about the company’s compliance with the contract requirements and that ensures such concerns are properly addressed and resolved.   

C&M Publishes Article in BNA Federal Contracts Report on Recent Supreme Court Holding that FOIA Response Falls Within FCA Public Disclosure Bar

Mana Elihu Lombardo

The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. §552, is intended to uphold the principles of transparency and open government, so that citizens can assess government accountability and actions. Since its enactment in 1966, FOIA has also been used by companies to obtain information about their competitors' prices and contract performance, as well as by watchdog organizations, qui tam plaintiffs and others who have used the fruits of FOIA requests to support their litigation goals. Kirk Schindler, the relator in a qui tam suit recently heard by the United States Supreme Court, is an example of someone who worked for a company, suspected that the company violated certain laws, and before proceeding with allegations against his employer, used FOIA as a tool to obtain documentation to support his case. As discussed in C&M’s recently published article in the BNA Federal Contracts Report, the use of a response to a FOIA request to support qui tam allegations may bar one's ability to maintain the suit.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision holding that a federal agency’s written response to a FOIA request for records constitutes a “report” within the meaning of the public disclosure bar in the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel Kirk). The article provides background on the role of the public disclosure bar under the False Claims Act, describes the facts and procedural posture of the Schindler case, recounts various Circuit Court’s previous decisions with regard to FOIA requests and the public disclosure bar, analyzes the future of the public disclosure bar as a defense to the FCA, and discusses the practical effect of the new law for procurement contractors.

Click here to view article.

Collateral Consequences of a False Claims Act Settlement

J. Catherine Kunz

Two years ago, GSA reached a $128 million settlement with Network Appliance, now known as NetApp Inc., based on a whistleblower False Claims Act (“FCA”) suit that alleged the company had failed to comply with the Price Reduction Clause of the contract. The settlement amount was, and continues to be, the largest Schedule contract fraud settlement reached by GSA.

While the company might have thought it had put the pain and expense of dealing with the lawsuit behind it, it now faces another legal action stemming from the FCA case. On August 9, 2011, Amalgamated Bank filed a complaint in Delaware state court seeking to compel inspection of NetApp’s books and records related to the company’s performance of its GSA Schedule contract. 

Amalgamated Bank serves as trustee of certain mutual funds which own shares of NetApp. Its complaint makes clear that the bank is searching for evidence of possible breaches of fiduciary duties by NetApp’s Board of Directors, specifically by “approving of and/or acquiescing in, and/or failing to monitor and prevent a course of systemic and sustained misconduct that allowed the [c]ompany consciously to ignore NetApp’s obligations to comply with federal procurement law . . . .”

The bank draws upon the facts alleged in the whistleblower’s complaint as a basis to demand books and records related to the company’s representations made to GSA concerning its compliance with contract requirements; the company’s compliance efforts and internal controls related to the Price Reduction Clause and Industrial Funding Fee provisions; any internal investigation or audit concerning the company’s contract compliance; and other related documents.

Whether or not the bank’s pursuit of NetApp’s Board of Directors will succeed is unknown at this time. But the fact that a company could face legal action by shareholders as a result of an FCA settlement is yet another indicator of the importance of avoiding FCA allegations in the first instance. While it is likely impossible to entirely remove the risk of having an FCA case filed against a company, particularly by a whistleblower, taking fundamental compliance steps, such as implementing and educating employees on policies, procedures, and internal controls specific to the requirements of the GSA Schedule contract (or any government contract), as well as conducting periodic internal reviews or audits to identify potential noncompliances will go a long way. In addition, instituting reporting mechanisms for employees to report concerns about contract compliance, and charging management with the responsibility to address and, if necessary, resolve reported concerns, will help companies prevent FCA allegations, particularly by disgruntled employees who believe, either accurately or mistakenly, that the company is not performing its government contracts appropriately.

Whistleblower Finally Gets His "Bite at the Apple" in Alleging TAA Non-Compliance

J. Catherine Kunz

Professional whistleblower Brady Folliard’s most recent False Claims Act suit against technology vendors alleging violations of the Trade Agreements Act (“TAA”) has survived a motion to dismiss with respect to two defendants (GovPlace and Government Acquisitions, Inc.), but otherwise has been dismissed for the other six defendants (which include Hewlett Packard and GTSI Corporation).

In this case, Mr. Folliard alleged that the defendants violated the False Claims Act by listing Hewlett Packard and Cisco products on their respective GSA Schedule and NASA Solution for Enterprise-Wide Procurement (“SEWP”) contracts that were manufactured in TAA non-compliant countries, that the defendants were aware that the products were not compliant and consciously misrepresented that fact to the Government, and that they submitted claims for money from the Government based on that misrepresentation. 

The district court dismissed the complaint against six of the defendants based on the False Claims Act’s “first-to-file” bar, finding that essentially the same allegations were leveled against the six defendants in United States ex rel. Crennen v. Dell Marketing L.P., 711 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D. Mass. 2010), which was filed prior to this case (and was subsequently dismissed). The court also determined that Mr. Folliard’s complaint was precluded on res judicata grounds as to defendant Hewlett Packard by a previous False Claims Act case Mr. Folliard had filed against that company, which was dismissed for failure to state a claim and failure to plead fraud with particularity (United States ex rel. Folliard v. Hewlett-Packard Company, 272 F.R.D. 21 (D.D.C. 2011).

Defendants GovPlace and Government Acquisitions, Inc. were the only defendants in this case who had not previously been sued by Mr. Folliard or another whistleblower alleging the same violations as in this case. While these defendants argued that the complaint should be dismissed against them based on Mr. Folliard’s failure to plead fraud with particularity, the court determined that the complaint contained sufficient information to meet the pleading requirements for a fraud case. Unlike other cases filed by Mr. Folliard, including the case against Hewlett Packard and United States ex re. Folliard v. CDW Technology Services, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2010), the court here determined that the complaint contained sufficient detail about the alleged misrepresentations of product compliance and identified specific procurement orders for non-compliant products.

This latest Folliard case is yet another reminder of the importance of ensuring from the outset that products listed for sale on GSA Schedule contracts as well as other government contracts are compliant with the Trade Agreements Act, putting measures in place to routinely re-affirm the country of origin during contract performance, and promptly removing non-compliant products. It is also a reminder that individuals beyond those who meet the typical whistleblower profile(i.e., disgruntled employees or ex-employees) are on the lookout for any indication of possible TAA non-compliance and could seize upon such information and file a False Claims Act case against you.

NY Company Pays $2.7 to Settle False Pricing Allegations

Derek Mullins

On June 2, 2011, the Department of Justice (“DoJ”) announced a $2.7 million settlement of a False Claims Act (“FCA”) case brought against Ultralife Corporation (“Ultralife”). The complaint alleges that Ultralife violated the FCA through the submission of false claims based on “defective pricing” under three contracts with the U.S. Army to provide lithium-manganese dioxide non-rechargeable batteries.  The settlement arose out of a government investigation following a 2005 Defense Contract Audit Agency (“DCAA”) audit suggesting a potential $1.4 million pricing adjustment related to the contracts.

The settlement was first made public in April, 2011, in Ultralife’s Form 8-K filing. The Form 8-K reported that, in light of the possible treble damages and penalties associated with the pricing adjustment, the Company had decided to enter into settlement negotiations with the government. As Ultralife described in further detail: “We had certain ‘exigent’, non-bid contracts with the U.S. government, which were subject to audit and final price adjustment, which resulted in decreased margins compared with the original terms of the contracts.” The DCAA suggested the adjustment based on reductions in the cost of materials prior to the final negotiation of the contracts. This finding prompted a 2007 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General inquiry, which was later consolidated with the DCAA audit by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of New York.

In negotiating with the Government, Ultralife took the position that the proposed adjustments could be offset with other cost increases also occurring prior to the final negotiation of the contracts. But, citing its desire to avoid further time and expenses, Ultralife agreed to a settlement with the Government to resolve the matter. In contrast to Ultralife’s description of the inquiry, the DoJ characterized it as a routine defective pricing allegation. According to the DoJ’s press release last Thursday, Ultralife provided government contracting personnel with false certifications regarding the company’s cost and pricing information for the three contracts in question; and thus, “improperly pass[ed] inflated costs on to the American taxpayers . . . .” 

Because of the settlement, the complete details will not be discovered. But Ultralife’s characterization of the matter raises several issues. Most importantly, if the Army’s need to procure the batteries was so urgent that the Army only approached Ultralife, why was it necessary for it to require the company to submit a proposal, including certified cost or pricing data? Also—assuming Ultralife’s characterization is correct—is it possible to provide defective pricing data on a “non-bid” contract? Although the answers are unknown, at the very least, this settlement should serve as a warning to those contractors who enter into such “exigent” contracts with government agencies.

Supreme Court Holds FOIA Response Falls Within FCA Public Disclosure Bar

Mana Elihu Lombardo

On Monday, May 16 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal agency’s written response to a FOIA request for records constitutes a “report” within the meaning of the public disclosure bar in the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C.  § 3729 et seq.  (See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel Kirk).  Reversing a decision of the Second Circuit, and resolving some discord between various circuit courts of appeal, the Court’s decision strengthened the public disclosure bar and characterized the case as “a classic example of the ‘opportunistic’ litigation that the public disclosure bar is designed to discourage.”  In its 5-3 decision,[1] the Court found that the words congressional, administrative or GAO, which precede the word report, “tell us nothing more than that a ‘report’ must be governmental.”

The FCA’s public disclosure bar precludes private parties from bringing qui tam suits to recover falsely or fraudulently obtained federal payments where those suits are “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media.”  31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).  In Schindler, the qui tam relator brought such a suit, alleging that his former employer had submitted hundreds of false claims for payments to the federal government.  The relator alleged that the company’s claims for payment were false because the company had falsely certified its compliance with the Vietnam Era Veteran’s Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972 (VEVRAA).  VEVRAA requires the company to submit to the government certain information, including how many of its employees are “qualified covered veterans,” on “VETS-100” forms on a yearly basis.  In support of his allegations, the relator relied on information regarding the company’s VETS-100 submissions that he obtained via three records requests his wife filed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552.

The district court granted the company’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the FCA’s public disclosure bar prohibited its jurisdiction over relator’s allegations that were based on information disclosed in a Government “report” or “investigation.”  The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s decision, effectively holding that an agency’s response to a FOIA request is neither a “report” nor an “investigation.”  The Supreme Court then reversed and remanded the Second Circuit’s decision, holding that a response to a FOIA request is a report for purposes of the FCA’s public disclosure bar.[2]  The Court reasoned that the word “report” in this context carries its ordinary, dictionary-defined meaning, and there is no textual basis for adopting a narrower definition of “report.” 

This Supreme Court decision resolves some discrepancy within the circuit courts of appeal with regard to this issue.  Although most circuits addressing the issue have already come to the conclusion that a response to a FOIA request constitutes a public disclosure, that conclusion was not uniform.  See e.g. United States v. Cath. Heatlhcare W., 445 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (response to FOIA request triggers public disclosure bar only if the underlying document itself emanates from an enumerated source in section 3730(e)(4)(A)); United States ex rel Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347-48 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring proof that relator’s allegations are actually derived from the publicly disclosed information). 

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s determination of this matter, however, the scope and applicability of the public disclosure bar may not be a closed issue.   The majority issued a strongly-worded opinion that derided the relator’s conduct as the very type of “opportunistic” conduct “that the public disclosure bar is designed to discourage.”  It further reasoned that a different interpretation of the public disclosure bar would allow anyone to “identify a few regulatory filing and certification requirements, submit FOIA requests until he discovers a federal contractor who is out of compliance, and potentially reap a windfall in a qui tam action under the FCA.”  The dissent, on the other hand, lamented that the Court “weaken[ed] the force of the FCA as a weapon against fraud on the part of Government contractors” by “severely   limit[ing] whistleblowers’ ability to substantiate their allegations before commencing suit.”  Accordingly, the dissent effectively invited Congress to turn its attention to the matter.  Of late, there has been much Congressional attention to strengthening anti-fraud laws, including recent amendments to the FCA through the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery of 2009, as well as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  Following this trend, it appears that further such legislation would not be out of the question.

 

 



[1] Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[2] The Court did not address whether an agency’s search in response to a FOIA request also qualifies as an “investigation.”

How to Avoid False Claims Act Allegations: Have a Systematic Process to Identify TAA Non-Compliant Products

J. Catherine Kunz

Home Depot was sued in 2008 by two whistleblowers claiming that the company had violated the False Claims Act by selling products that did not comply with the Trade Agreements Act (“TAA”) to the U.S. government through its GSA Schedule contract. The United States has not intervened in the case. Home Depot recently moved for reconsideration of the court’s denial of its motion to dismiss the allegations. In denying Home Depot’s second attempt to get the complaint dismissed, the court carefully walked through the elements of False Claims Act liability and determined that the complaint was properly pled. U.S. ex rel. Scott v. Actus Lend Lease, LLC et al., Case No. 2:08-cv-07940 (Apr. 22, 2011 C.D. Cal.).

For example, the court determined that the complaint sufficiently alleged facts demonstrating the submission of false claims, by finding that the qui tam relators (i.e., whistleblowers) had provided a spreadsheet listing 118 representative examples of transactions involving products sold to particular government customers that were manufactured in non-designated countries. The court rejected Home Depot’s argument that its claims for payment themselves did not explicitly misrepresent compliance with the TAA, and relied on well-established case law holding that requesting payment for goods or services of lesser quality than those ordered by the government or that failed to meet contractual requirements or specifications can also constitute false claims for payment. Note that this case differs from other recent False Claims Act actions against GSA Schedule contractors alleging TAA non-compliance, e.g., the Folliard case, which were dismissed because the relators failed to show that the government had actually purchased the non-compliant products. 

The court then determined that the complaint contained facts to support the allegation that Home Depot knowingly presented the false claims to the government because the relators had alleged that, although Home Depot knew that its GSA Schedule contract required compliance with the TAA and that it sourced products from China, a TAA non-designated country, the company knowingly failed to “institute any mechanism” to ensure that TAA non-compliant items were not sold off its Schedule contract to the government. 

It is vitally important for GSA Schedule contractors to ensure, both at the start of contract performance and on a regular basis throughout the life of the contract, that items offered for sale to the government are compliant with the Trade Agreements Act. Implementing a process through which a Schedule contractor investigates at regular intervals the source of products listed for sale on its Schedule contract is advisable. Often times companies change suppliers, or suppliers themselves change their sources of products, so even if a Schedule contractor ensures at the start of its contract that all listed products are TAA compliant, it should not assume its Schedule is TAA compliant going forward. Particularly given the five year (or more) duration of a GSA Schedule contract, there can be numerous changes in the supply chain leading to TAA non-compliance. Conducting regular and on-going due diligence on the country of origin of products offered for sale on a GSA Schedule contract will go a long way toward protecting the contractor from a viable False Claims Act allegation.

FCA Seal Provisions Upheld by the Fourth Circuit

Dalal Hasan

The qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., allow private individuals to file suit on behalf of the United States when they have evidence or information that false claims or false statements related to false claims were made to the government. When the FCA was originally enacted in 1863, qui tam complaints were public documents, which meant that a complaint’s allegations of fraud were open to members of the public and were not hidden from the named defendant. In 1986, however, Congress amended the FCA by adding new seal provisions to the statute. These provisions require every qui tam complaint to be filed under seal for 60 days to give the government time to investigate the complaint’s allegations and to decide whether it wants to intervene in the action. While the initial sealing period is only 60 days, cases typically remain under seal for a year or more while the government investigates.

In ACLU v. Holder, (4th Cir. Mar. 28, 2011), the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), joined by OMB Watch and the Government Accountability Project, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the seal provisions. The ACLU argued that the seal provisions violate the First Amendment by denying the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings and by gagging qui tam relators from speaking about their qui tam complaints. The ACLU also argued that the seal provisions violate the Constitution’s separation of powers clause by infringing on the authority of lower federal courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a particular qui tam complaint should be unsealed.

In a split 2-1 decision, the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the seal provisions and affirmed the dismissal of the ACLU’s case. Assuming, without deciding, that the First Amendment right of access extends to a qui tam complaint and docket sheet, the court held that denial of access did not violate the First Amendment because the FCA’s seal provisions are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest of protecting the integrity of ongoing fraud investigations. The court cited three reasons for finding that the provisions were narrowly tailored: (1) Congress balanced the government’s investigatory needs against the need for public access to court documents by crafting a detailed and limited 60-day process for initiating and pursuing a qui tam complaint under the FCA; (2) the seal provisions mandate judicial review at the end of the 60-day period, requiring the government to demonstrate “good cause” to a federal court in order to extend the seal; and (3) the seal provisions limit the relator only from publicly discussing the filing of the qui tam complaint, not the existence of the fraud. 

  

The court also held that the ACLU and other groups lacked standing to assert the claim that the FCA’s gag order provision preventing qui tam relators from speaking about their qui tam complaints violated the First Amendment. The court rejected the ACLU’s attempt to establish First Amendment standing as persons who are “‘willing listeners’ to a willing speaker who, but for the restriction, would convey information,” because the ACLU failed to identify any particular qui tam relator who, but for the seal provisions, was a willing speaker who desired to speak with them.

 

The court also rejected the argument that the seal provisions violate the separation of powers under the Constitution, holding that the FCA seal provisions are “a proper subject of congressional legislation and do not intrude on ‘the zone of judicial self-administration to such a degree as to prevent the judiciary from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.’”

 

Judge Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion in which he observed that the result of upholding the seal provisions meant that “we may never know what wasteful spending and fraud against the public fisc persists because of government delay, inaction, or under enforcement . . . .” In his dissent, Judge Gregory concluded that the sealing requirement is facially unconstitutional because “it automatically and categorically seals all FCA complaints for at least 60 days,” and the Government failed to justify its First Amendment infringement with compelling interests and narrow tailoring. He noted that “the freedom to speak about FCA complaints bolsters the public role of relators and pressures the government to rigorously enforce the FCA—or to expeditiously decline to intervene.”

 

It remains to be seen whether the case will be appealed to the Supreme Court or reconsidered by the Fourth Circuit en banc

The Verizon Settlement

Raja Mishra

Verizon Communications, Inc. recently paid the U.S. government $93.5 million to resolve False Claims Act allegations that it overcharged the government on voice and data telecommunications services contracts.  In addition to the significance of the amount paid, the case is notable for both the government’s aggressive enforcement of FAR provisions and the fact the alleged fraud occurred in the midst of a massive and complex telecom merger. Both underscore the need for timely and astute Government Contracts counseling.

Verizon subsidiary MCI Communications Services Inc. dba Verizon Business Services (“MCI”) is alleged to have invoiced the General Service Administration (“GSA”) for a variety of federal, state and local taxes and surcharges in violation of the contracts or applicable regulations in connection with the FTS2001 and FTS2001 Bridge contracts to provide voice and data telecommunications to an array of federal agencies.  The Department of Justice’s (“DoJ’s) joint investigation with GSA’s Office of the Inspector General found that Verizon and MCI submitted false claims under the contracts for the reimbursement of property taxes, common carrier recovery charges and unallowable surcharges -- charges that the government alleges are not directly reimbursable under the FTS2001 contracts.

According to the complaint in United States ex rel. Stephen M. Shea and 2Probe LLC v. Verizon Communications, Inc., MCI began submitting fraudulent invoices to GSA in 1999 that included surcharges for federal, state and local taxes, as well as certain duties, bundled into line items that “conceal the true nature of the charges.”  FAR 52.229-04, among other provisions governing the FTS2001 contract, states, “[u]nless otherwise provided in this contract, the contract price includes all applicable Federal, States and local taxes and duties.”  Since the FTS2001 contract did not provide for tax-related surcharges, MCI’s surcharges violated the reg, according to the complaint.

The government alleged the fraud lasted from 1999 to 2010.  In 2006, Verizon acquired MCI for $6.75 billion during a period of frenzied consolidation in the telecom industry. Verizon inherited the FTS2001 contract --and the government alleges the fraudulent billing continued unabated.

The government learned of the alleged fraud from relator Stephen Shea, a telecom consultant who assisted corporations in managing telecom costs. According to the complaint, Shea first noticed the errant surcharges in the communications bills of his corporate clients. (The other relator, 2Probe LLC, is owned by Shea and a Delaware-based corporate litigator.) GSA’s Inspector General and DoJ then jointly investigated the matter.  DoJ announced the settlement on April 5. Verizon agreed to $92.7 million plus interest; the whistleblowers’ share has yet to be decided.

“This $93 million recovery should make contractors realize that we are firmly committed to ensuring the integrity of corporate billing practices with respect to government programs,” said U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Ronald C. Machen, Jr., in a statement.

The case offers lessons. First, it pays to closely scrutinize the myriad regulations incorporated into government contracts. And such scrutiny is all the more crucial during fast-moving corporate deals, when contractual details can get lost in the shuffle. 

Certification Certitude: The Fifth Circuit Rejects Broad False Claims Act Liability Theory

Jonathan Cone

Jonathan Cone and Robert Rhoad contributed to this blog post.

Did you hear that?  It was a collective sigh of relief from companies contracting with the federal government thanks to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc. In Steury, the Fifth Circuit found that a company that contracts with the government cannot be punished under the False Claims Act – the government’s primary anti-fraud statute, and a potent one at that – by merely violating a contractual provision or federal statute or regulation. (N1)  To be liable under the FCA, the court wrote, a company must falsely certify compliance with a contractual provision, statute, or regulation that is a prerequisite to payment.  Unless the government’s payment was conditioned on adherence to a specific provision, statute or regulation, the “crucial distinction” between punitive FCA liability and ordinary breaches of contract would be lost.

To read more, please visit The Washington Legal Foundation blog.

A Half Truth is Still a Whole Lie That Risks Triple Damages: The Government's Crackdown on Factual Misstatements in Proposals for Contracts and Grants

Mana Elihu Lombardo

Mana Lombardo and Jonathan Cone contributed to this blog post.

Winning government contracts and grants is vital to the survival of many organizations. It is not surprising then that contractors and grantees sometimes include embellishments and small misstatements in their proposals for government funds. A little puffery never hurt anyone, right? Wrong. Making even a minor factual misstatement or neglecting to provide complete information in a contract or grant proposal may, in some situations, lead the government to allege that it was defrauded and seek to recover three-times the value of the agreement using the civil False Claims Act. Such a significant recovery seems inconsistent with the FCA, which was intended to remedy the government's actual— not consequential— financial harm. The statute has a separate penalty provision that serves a punitive function and provides remuneration over and above making the government whole. While damages in the amount of the entire value of the contract may exceed the government's actual financial loss, the government has obtained that sort of windfall recovery in two recent cases.  Click here to link to read full article, published in BNA's Federal Contract Report, Oct. 5, 2010, 94 FCR 345.

Developments in Oracle GSA Schedule FCA Case

J. Catherine Kunz

As discussed in my blog post in June, the Department of Justice intervened in a False Claims Act case filed by a whistleblower against Oracle which alleged that the company had failed to accurately disclose its commercial pricing practices to the government in association with its GSA Schedule contract. DOJ has now filed its complaint (.pdf) in this case.

The complaint largely tracks the allegations in the complaint filed by the whistleblower, who is a former Oracle employee. For example, DOJ’s complaint alleges that Oracle provided false, incomplete, and inaccurate information to the government during its negotiation of the Schedule contract. Not only does this allegation assert that Oracle’s actual discounting practices to its commercial customers were not fully or accurately reflected in its disclosures to the government, but also DOJ asserts that Oracle’s actual commercial pricing practices did not distinguish between different classes of commercial customers, even though the company’s disclosures to the government had included one set of discounts for “national accounts” customers and a different set for “commercial end users.” 

The complaint also alleges that the company actively took steps to ensure that its commercial sales to its basis of award customers did not trigger the Price Reductions Clause by means such as increasing the order size to exceed the contract’s maximum order threshold, arranging for the sale through a reseller rather than directly from Oracle, or changing the terms of the software license sold to the commercial customer so that it differed from the terms of the licenses on the GSA Schedule contract.  It will be interesting to watch the development of this allegation in particular, because, typically, Schedule contractors can legitimately distinguish certain of its commercial sales to its basis of award customers from those sales that trigger the Price Reductions Clause.       

Yet Another Fraud Case Against a GSA Schedule Contractor

J. Catherine Kunz

On June 16, 2010, the media reported that a False Claims Act case had been filed by a whistleblower against Oracle Corporation alleging that the company had failed to disclose deep discounts given to the most favored commercial customers. The Department of Justice has intervened and unsealed the relator’s complaint. The Government has not yet filed its complaint but is expected to do so this summer.

GSA Schedule contractors are clearly in the hot seat for fraud allegations: Recall the NetApp settlement of $128 million reached a year ago that was based on a relator’s allegation of failure to comply with the Price Reductions Clause. Then there were the Folliard and United States ex rel. Crennen v. Dell Marketing LP (__ F. Supp. 2d. __, 2010 WL 1713633 (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 2010)) decisions issued a few months ago, both alleging that sales of products purportedly non-compliant with the Trade Agreements Act resulted in the submission of false claims by Schedule contractors. Just last month, the EMC settlement was announced, resolving allegations of false claims and improper fee payments to encourage the sale of EMC’s products off its Schedule contract. Of course, Oracle settled a prior False Claims Act case in 2006 that alleged that commercial discounts had not been properly disclosed to GSA on PeopleSoft’s (later acquired by Oracle) Schedule contract. 

This new Oracle complaint again reminds us of the risk of fraud allegations when performing a GSA Schedule contract.  Particularly because many GSA Schedule contract holders have little to no other federal government business, they apply for a Schedule contract with little consideration of the unique requirments with which they will be expected to comply -- particularly the disclosure and pricing requirements.  These fraud cases underscore the importance not only of disclosing the required commerical pricing information and negotiating a workable Most Favored Customer for Schedule performance, but also of having workable internal policies and procedures that allow the contractor to comply with the Schedule contract's requirements without compromising its commercial business pursuits.  Does your company have the policies and procedures it needs to ensure compliance with Schedule requirements?   

Recent Settlement in IT Kickback Suits: A New Clause for Justice?

J. Catherine Kunz

On May 25, 2010, the Justice Department announced an $87.5 million settlement with EMC  for alleged false claims associated with EMC’s GSA Schedule contract. The settlement comes out of a series of qui tam suits filed against IT companies and systems integration consultants by relators Norman Rille and Neal Roberts in the Eastern District of Arkansas in 2004. The Justice Department intervened in the cases.

While some of the allegations were unique to each defendant, the common thread throughout the cases was the allegation that the IT companies’ improperly made payments of “finders fees,” “influencer fees,” rebates, and the like to companies (referenced in the complaints as systems integration consultants or alliance partners) who made recommendations to the U.S. Government about which IT products and services to procure. The relators’ asserted that such payments were kickbacks that violated the Anti-Kickback Act, and also resulted in false claims being submitted to the Government.

The recent EMC settlement serves as a reminder to government contractors, particularly those in the IT community, that payments to third parties for influencing Government purchases of one’s products or services – particularly when such payments are not disclosed to the Government – are risky at best. The settlement is interesting, though, for a second reason. It contains a clause  addressing EMC’s solvency that the Justice Department has not, to date, typically included in its settlement agreements: 

“EMC warrants that it has reviewed its financial situation and that it currently is solvent . . . , and shall remain solvent following payment to the United States of the Settlement Amount. . . .”

Is the Government worried that EMC’s payment of the settlement amount could prejudice other creditors under the bankruptcy laws? Is this clause going to be a standard clause in settlement agreements with the U.S. Government going forward? Will it be effective in precluding creditors from challenging settlements with the Government?

Are Your Products TAA Compliant? If Not, Your Competitor Might Blow the Whistle on You.

J. Catherine Kunz

Almost five years ago, a number of large office products companies with GSA Schedule contracts settled allegations that they had submitted false claims when selling office products to the U.S. Government that were not compliant with the Trade Agreements Act (“TAA”). The allegations came not from a government audit or from employees of these companies, but from employees of a competitor who also sold office products to the Government through its own GSA Schedule contract. The Government investigated the allegations and came away with sizeable settlement amounts from each of the companies involved. Moreover, the competitor’s employees – the qui tam relators – received over a million dollars. 

Now, another competitor has pursued a False Claims Act case against a fellow GSA Schedule holder. In United States ex re. Folliard v. CDW Technology Services, Inc., an employee of a competing reseller filed a qui tam False Claims Act suit against CDW Government Inc. and its parent, CDW Technology Services, Inc., for including products on both its GSA Schedule contract and NASA Solutions for Enterprise-Wide Procurement (“SEWP”) contract that are manufactured in countries other than TAA-designated countries. 

The genesis of the case against CDW is interesting because both CDW and the company for which Folliard, the qui tam relator, works are resellers of Hewlett Packard equipment, and both have GSA and SEWP contracts. According to the court’s decision on CDW’s motion to dismiss, HP provides its resellers with country of origin information for its products. Therefore, Folliard was able to determine which HP products offered for sale on CDW’s GSA and SEWP contracts were not TAA compliant. While the court determined that Folliard did not plead sufficient facts to make out a False Claims Act case against CDW with respect to its GSA contract, Folliard’s allegations that CDW submitted false claims when selling HP products off its SEWP contract survived CDW’s motion to dismiss. 

This case will be instructive to watch as it unfolds, and serves as a reminder for government contractors that your competitors are keeping an eye on how you conduct your government business. Given the potential monetary windfall for False Claims Act relators, your competitors and their employees will be tempted to capitalize on publicly-available information indicating possible violations and noncompliances. And given the success of past relators with TAA-related allegations, combined with GSA’s continued focus on TAA compliance for its Schedule contractors, companies should take a close look at their product offerings on the GSA Schedule and other government wide acquisition vehicles to ensure they comply with the TAA requirements.